From antagonistic autonomy to relational autonomy: A theoretical reflection from the southern cone

ABSTRACT

The concept of autonomy has acquired a plurality of meanings in international relations; this article analyzes the distinct uses given to this term in Latin America and its relationship to theoretical contributions from outside the region. The authors propose a far-reaching reconceptualization of autonomy appropriate to Latin America's new circumstances in the global context. They argue that these new circumstances favor the shift from autonomy as traditionally defined to what they call relational autonomy, a construct based on contributions from classical political theory, political sociology, gender studies, social and philosophical psychology, and the theory of complex thought.

The concept of autonomy, like so many other terms employed in international relations, has a plurality of meanings. It has been commonly used in at least three different ways. The first is as one of the two principles (together with territoriality) of the Westphalian model. In this sense, autonomy implies that "no external actor has authority within the limits of the state" (Krasner 1995-6, 116), and is equivalent to "Westphalian-Vattelian sovereignty" as Stephen Krasner defines it; that is, a government's right to be independent of external authority structures (Krasner 1999, 35). The rule of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states derives from this principle.

Autonomy as a principle or right has frequently been transgressed by the actions of both state and nonstate actors that have availed themselves of contexts or circumstances characterized by asymmetries of power. Furthermore, according to Krasner, governments have willfully subordinated their own autonomy to other principles considered more valuable; for example, the defense and promotion of human rights and democracy (Krasner 1995-96).

The second use of the concept is as a condition that allows the nation-state to articulate and achieve political goals independently. According to this meaning, autonomy is a property that the state may or may not enjoy along a continuum with two ideal types at the extremes: total dependence or complete autonomy.

This meaning of the concept applies to both domestic and international contexts. In general terms, the state enjoys internal autonomy when the goals it seeks and formulates do not exclusively reflect the demands or interests of particular social groups.1 In turn, the notion of external autonomy is normally used to characterize the ability of the state, understood as the capacity and determination to make decisions based on its own needs and objectives without interference or restrictions from abroad, and to control processes or events produced beyond its borders. In both cases, autonomy is always a question of degree that depends mainly on the attributes of power, both hard and soft, of states and the external conditions they face.

The concept is used in a third sense as one of the objective national interests of states (the other two are survival and economic welfare; see Wendt 1999, 138). These three interests can be described informally as "life, property, and freedom" (George and Keohane 1980).2 According to Alexander Wendt, these interests, common to all states, are not merely normative guides for action; they are also causal forces that predispose states to act in a certain way (Wendt 1999, 234). Paraphrasing Hans Morgenthau, national interests are an "objective category of universal validity," although they are not immutable. Their relevance and hierarchy depend on the political and cultural context in which foreign policy is formulated. Of course, policies aimed to promote such interests can be defined in terms of the general interests of society, a social class, certain elites, or the state itself.

The defense and expansion of autonomy is thus converted into a pattern of activity that all states apply, to the extent that they wish to reproduce themselves and preserve their freedom. The nature of this pattern depends substantially on national factors and the "logic" prevailing in the anarchical structure of the international system. Thus, changes in the internal environment can lead states to define their own autonomy objectives differently, even in regard to external pressures and opportunities. The shift from a systemic situation characterized by a high degree of anarchy (a system closer to Hobbesian rationality) to one more marked by elements of international society d la Bull should have equally significant effects on this pattern of activity (Bull 1977, 3-22).

During the long life of the Westphalian system, states have often applied adaptive strategies in order to protect or to achieve the three objective national interests mentioned above. The achievement of these goals has really depended on the ability of states to transform themselves in the face of new circumstances and challenges, both internal and international. At the same time, these interests have often been considered to be contradictory, or at least in permanent tension, given that they may create difficult dilemmas for states. For example, it is often pointed out that states, like human beings, have had to surrender many areas of freedom for the sake of greater security or material improvement. In the words of Mark Zacher, while states seek autonomy, they are, in reality, willing to trade off autonomy against other goals, such as the preservation of life, economic welfare, and even ethical values, under certain circumstances. States' ranking of preferences can change as international conditions evolve, and therefore general policy priorities must be seen as endogenous to any theory of international relations (Zacher 1992, 63).