From antagonistic autonomy to relational autonomy: A theoretical reflection from the southern cone

Mona Harrington, inspired by Nancy Chodorow's work on the process of infant socialization, holds that the concept of individual autonomy is implanted early in males, who must identify themselves as being different, establishing precise limits between themselves and their mothers, and affirming their opposition with respect to their mothers, in terms of both their own woman-nonwoman nature and, definitively, their absolute autonomy (Harrington 1992, 112). This viewpoint, transferred to the plane of international relations, has led Harrington, among others, to hold that

masculine concepts of autonomy produce a view of separate sovereign states as embodying a unitary interest in confrontation with other states and as properly engaging in competition and self-interested change . . .[this] perpetuates and legitimizes a social Darwinist order within states and among states. And it is possible that the impetus behind this order is a child-rearing dynamic that cultivates personal autonomy as a dominating element of masculinity, lending a crucial emotional push to a politics of separation. ... With autonomy at its heart, its [the state's] behavior must be marked by boundedness, suspicion, hostility, and efforts to control whatever forces might threaten the sovereign self. (Harrington 1992, 157)

Females, by contrast, as Christine Sylvester indicates, do not develop their identity in terms of opposites and therefore naturally harbor a notion of relational autonomy (Sylvester 1992, 157).

Valuable contributions from the fields of philosophical and social psychology enhance understanding of the importance of the role played by the agent of autonomy and especially its evolutionary nature. This last aspect highlights the specific conditions that favor the effective exercise of autonomy, in reference not to the social context in which the agents are embedded but to the essential properties the agent must possess in order to develop autonomy. These include

* A degree of cognitive, emotional, and expressive individuation (one who, for whatever reason, does not achieve an acceptable degree of independence in the identity-forming process is not considered autonomous)

* Responsibility for actions undertaken

* The competence to elect others from among different alternatives, to produce desired effects, to extend the repertoire of one's abilities, and to assume a critical attitude regarding one's own preferences, as well as the preferences, demands, and options of others (Vidiella 2000, 63-64; Haworth 1986, 1-5)

For many authors, this last property is "the foundation of autonomy" (Haworth 1986, 2). Psychologist R. W. White, furthermore, has suggested that the terms autonomy and competence are identical in meaning (Haworth 1986, 2-3).

Finally, the theory of complex thought provides "the distinct vision of autonomy," as Edgar Morin puts it, that is crucial for consolidating a notion of relational autonomy for international relations (Morin 1996; 2000, 16). Two of Morin's ideas are particularly useful. One is that "it is necessary to replace the notion that the external environment imposes its fatalities" and at the same time "it is possible to increase the choice of alternatives independently" (Morin 1996, 2000). The second, and even more important, is the idea that autonomy and dependence are not opposed to each other, because no autonomous being or organization can exist independently of an external medium.