Democracy without parties? Political parties and regime change in Fujimori's Peru

Latin American Politics and Society, Fall 2003 by Levitsky, Steven, Cameron, Maxwell A

Lacking experience with the give and take of democratic politics, Fujimori opted for an authoritarian strategy for political survival, designed by his security adviser, Vladimiro Montesinos: the April 1992 autogolpe. Although there is no guarantee that the regime would have survived under a party-backed politician, it is reasonable to suggest that Fujimori, an antipolitical-establishment outsider without any socialization in the political process, was particularly open to an authoritarian alternative.

Authoritarian Success and the Rise of Political "Independents"

Although the crisis of the 1980s badly weakened the Peruvian party system, it was Fujimori's success in the wake of the 1992 autogolpe that proved more devastating. Although widely discredited, the established parties survived the 1990 election (Tanaka 1998, 194-95; Planas 2000, 337). APRA won a surprising 25 percent of the legislative vote, and AP, the PPC, and the IU all retained an important presence in the congress.

What ultimately sealed the fate of the party system was the outcome of Fujimori's high-stakes battle with the established parties. As Martin Tanaka (1998,198-200) has argued, outsider presidents Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil and Jorge Serrano of Guatemala lost similar battles during this period. Had Fujimori been impeached like Collor, or had he failed in his autogolpe attempt like Serrano, Peru's party system might have ended up similar to those of Brazil and Guatemala: weak and discredited but essentially intact.10

Fujimori, however, succeeded. His claim that the autogolpe was necessary to rid Peru of a "false democracy" (Paredes Castro et al. 1992) dominated by party cliques was, by and large, accepted by Peruvians. Public support for Fujimori jumped from 53 percent in March 1992 to 81 percent after the autogolpe (Tanaka 1998, 219), and over the next three years, the president's average approval rating was a whopping 66 percent (based on data from Tanaka 1998, 219). Fujimori's popularity helped to create a broad base of support for the new regime. Fujimorista forces easily won the constituent assembly elections held in November 1992: Fujimori's New Majority/C-90 won 49 percent of the vote, compared to 9.8 percent for the second-place PPC. The following year, a new constitution was approved-albeit with greater difficulty-via referendum. In 1995, Fujimori was easily reelected, winning a stunning 62.4 percent of the vote and gaining an absolute majority in the new congress.

The autogolpe s success was based largely on its timing (Tanaka 1998, 220-21). During the months immediately preceding and following the coup, Fujimori vanquished two forces that Peruvians had come to find unbearable: hyperinflation and the cycle of protest and violence that had culminated in the terrorism of Shining Path. The autogolpe was carried out at a time when economic stabilization was taking hold and Fujimori's popularity was on the rise (Tanaka 1998, 220-21). The capture of Shining Path leader Abimael Guzman several months later helped to consolidate that support. By late 1992, a clear majority of Peruvians had decided that Fujimori represented the sort of strong leader for whom they had been yearning.