Moving Beyond the Policy of No Policy: Emigration from Mexico and Central America

Latin American Politics and Society, Winter 2004 by Rosenblum, Marc R

The 15 years ending in 1996 were characterized by a pair of contrasting trends: dramatic improvements in the overall state of U.S.-Mexican relations but a sharp deterioration in migration relations. Bilateral tensions during the 1980s existed on at least five levels. Perhaps the most important conflict was over Mexico's economic crisis. Although the Reagan administration grudgingly offered assistance in the aftermath of the 1982 default and devaluation, many Mexicans resented President Miguel de la Madrid's neoliberal moves, and the Reagan administration saw even these changes as too little, too late. Additional sources of tension included Mexican opposition to U.S. intervention in the Central American civil wars and U.S. resentment of Mexico's support for the Contadora Central American peace process; Mexico's weak record on democracy and political corruption; Mexico's role as a source and transfer point for narcotics entering the United States; and the problem of undocumented immigration from Mexico to the United States.

By the mid-1990s, three of these issues had been fully resolved. Mexico's commitment to a full menu of neoliberal policy choices since the administration of Carlos Salinas and U.S. economic support for Mexico (including that conveyed via NAFTA) had combined to make Mexico the United States' number two trading partner and had reduced economic tensions. The contrast between President Ronald Reagan's grudging economic assistance in 1982 and President Bill Clinton's generous response to Mexico's 1994-95 peso crisis is illustrative. Second, the Central American civil wars were over, thanks in part to U.S.-Mexican collaboration in support of El Salvador's 1992 peace settlement.12 Third, Mexican elections at all levels were recognized as increasingly free and fair by the mid-1990s, certainly to the point that Mexican democracy was no longer a subject of open debate among U.S. politicians.

Even the issue of narcotics was less problematic, at least at the executive-to-executive level. The U.S. Congress continued to press the issue, among other means, via the annual certification debate.13 President Clinton, however, differed from his predecessors by consistently supporting Mexico's cause, and threatened a veto when Congress moved to "decertify" Mexico in 1997.14

While relations thus improved in four areas, migration was a conspicuous countertrend. Following the 1986 passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which Mexicans understood as targeting them in particular, the United States expanded border enforcement in 1993. Then Californians passed Proposition 187 in 1994 to deny social services to undocumented immigrants, a move echoed at the national level two years later with the 1996 passage of IIRIRA, welfare reform, and the Effective Death Penalty and Counter-Terrorism Act.

The contrast between migration and other bilateral issues was driven home during the IRCA and NAFTA debates. In the former case, no executive branch discussions were held at any level, even as President Reagan supported (for domestic reasons) an amnesty for undocumented Mexicans. Mexico refused an invitation to testify before the Senate Immigration Subcommittee and neglected to engage in any serious public relations campaign aimed at U.S. audiences (Chabat 1989; Vernez 1989). In contrast, Mexico spent at least US$45 million while employing nine separate lobbying firms during the 1992-93 debate on NAFTA (Domínguez and Fernândez de Castro 2001; Eisenstadt 1997; Grayson 1998). Coincidentally or not, the IRCA legislation omitted proposed amendments that would have minimized the bill's impact on Mexico.15 Mexico won a number of important concessions, however, en route to a mutually beneficial NAFTA agreement (Mayer 1998, Wise 1998).