Friends in High Places: Congressional Influence on the Bureaucracy in Chile

Latin American Politics and Society, Summer 2008 by Ferraro, Agustín

ABSTRACT

Chile presents a paradox for legislative studies. In most comparative research on the political power of presidents and assemblies in Latin America, the Chilean presidency is considered one of the most powerful in the region. The country's congress is seen, accordingly, as weak and lacking influence over public policy. Such evaluations, however, tend to be based on constitutional and legal faculties (that is, formal powers), and they overlook the substantial influence exerted by the Chilean Congress through informal political channels. This article analyzes literature on informal politics that shows the substantial influence of Chile's Congress on public policy; and, for comparison, presents an empirical study that adds several details to current accounts of congressional influence on the bureaucracy in Chile and describes two mechanisms of congressional influence not contemplated by recent research.

Several studies in recent years have measured and compared the relative political power of presidents and assemblies in Latin America and other regions, employing criteria specifically designed for the purpose. Among the executives, the president of Chile tends to be regarded as one of the most powerful, if not the most powerful in Latin America, and the Chilean Congress, therefore, as weak and lacking influence over public policy decisions. Such comparative measurements are typically based on constitutional and legal faculties, however; often, they do not seriously explore the possible divergence between formal powers and real political strength. Indeed, many studies do not even mention this divergence.

This study will consider two remarkable exceptions to this methodological neglect: namely the work of Lee Metcalf and Peter Siavelis, who thoroughly analyze possible discrepancies between constitutional faculties and political power in new democracies. They deal with the subject in the context of the debate over presidential systems in Latin America or Eastern Europe, and they arrive, interestingly, at completely opposite conclusions. Metcalf contends that informal sources cannot be included-at least for the moment-in the measurements of power. Siavelis regards evaluations of political power that only take into account the constitution and the laws as superficial. Siavelis bases his position on the case of Chile, observing that the Chilean legislature has substantial influence on public policy despite the president's vast constitutional authority.

Siavelis is not the only scholar who has remarked on this Chilean paradox. Several authors have pointed out the major influence of the Chilean Congress on legislation and public policy. They agree on the informal character of this influence and also observe that a literal reading of the constitution and the laws gives the (wrong) impression that such influence does not exist. Their work, as well as the present study, belongs to a new research approach that focuses on informal politics.

A classic paper by O'Donnell (1996) can be considered the starting point for the study of Latin American informal politics. In this context, the practice of carrying out measurements of presidential and congressional powers mostly in formal terms had already been remarked-and deplored-by Weyland (2002). The research on informal politics has now been strengthened with the publication of a general theoretical approach (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 2006a), together with several studies of specific informal political practices and institutions in Latin America (Helmke and Levitsky 2006b).

In the case of Chile, studies on informal politics provide, on the one hand, empirical evidence supporting the thesis that congressional influence on public policy exists, and that it is significant. On the other hand, some authors also describe specific informal practices and mechanisms on which this influence is based. This research has only recently begun, however, and it remains fragmentary. The present study attempts to contribute to the latter question, adding to our knowledge of mechanisms of congressional influence on the public bureaucracy in Chile. It includes an empirical study based on recent interviews.

The study adds several details to current accounts of informal congressional influence in Chile, and introduces two further mechanisms of influence not contemplated by recent research. A related but crucial question is also discussed: are these informal practices just transitory arrangements of the democratic transition in Chile, which could disappear in time; or do they represent longstanding political traditions, and should they be considered permanent features of the political system?

Interviews with 29 key informants were conducted in Santiago de Chile and in a district capital in 2005 and 2006. The interviews show the informal influence of Congress from the perspective of the public officials themselves, on whom this influence is exerted.1 High-level public managers, political authorities, and medium-level officials (professionals) were interviewed. The criteria for the selection of informants are discussed at the beginning of the third section, together with certain methodological issues related to the key informant technique as employed for this research. This article concludes by discussing some methodological consequences of the study, focusing on the question of the relationship between formal and informal sources of political power in Latin America.