Minimum Winning Electoral Coalitions Under Presidentialism: Reality or Fiction? The Case of Brazil

Latin American Politics and Society, Fall 2009 by Machado, Aline

ABSTRACT

This article studies the motivations of party leaders to form "minimum winning" electoral coalitions-alliances that cease to be winning if one member is subtracted. In Brazil, concurrent elections stimulate political actors' coordination, and electoral alliances are allowed. In 2002 and 2006, moreover, the Electoral Supreme Court obliged those parties with presidential candidates to replicate this electoral arrangement in the district. Under "verticalization," parties with presidential candidates could not form alliances with rival parties in the concurrent legislative and gubernatorial elections. Verticalization arguably pushed party leaders to form minimum winning electoral coalitions. This new rule forced them to reconsider the contributions of each possible ally in the elections for president, federal deputy, and governor. Examining the elections from 1998 to 2006, this study finds that under verticalization, while parties did form more electoral coalitions with those partners they considered crucial to win, they did so at the expense of policy.

Abbreviations

PAN Partido dos Aposentados da Na��o Party of the Nation's Retirees

PC do B Partido Comunista do Brasil Communist Party of Brazil

PCB Partido Comunista Brasileiro razilian Communist Party

PCO Partido da Causa Operar�a Workers' Cause Party

PDT Partido Democr�tico Trabalhista emocratic Labor Party

PFL Partido da Frente Liberal Liberal Front Party

PGT Partido Geral dos Trabalhadores General Party of the Workers

PHS Partido Humanista da Solidariedade Humanist Party of Solidarity

PL Partido Liberal Liberal Party

PMDB Partido do Movimento Democr�tico Brasileiro Brazilian Democratic Movement Party

PMN Partido da Mobiliza��o Nacional Party of National Mobilization

PP Partido Progressista Progressive Party

PPB Partido Progressista Bras�eiro Brazilian Progressive Party

PPS Partido Popular Socialista Socialist People's Party

PR Partido da Rep�blica Republic Party

PRB Partido Republicano Brasileiro Brazilian Republic Party

PRN Partido da Reconstru��o Nacional National Reconstruction Party

PRONA Partido da Reedifica��o da Ordern Nacional Party of the Reconstruction of the National Order

PRP Partido Republicano Progressista Progressive Republican Party

PRTB Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro Brazilian Labor Renewal Party

PSB Partido Socialista Brasileiro Brazilian Socialist Party

PSC Partido Social Cristao Christian Social Party

PSD Partido Social Democr�tico Social Democratic Party

PSDB Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira Brazilian Social Democracy Party

PSDC Partido Social Dem�crata Crist�o Christian Social Democratic Party

PSL Partido Social Liberal Social Liberal Party

PSN Partido Solidarista Nacional National Solidarity Party

PSOL Partido Socialismo e Liberdade Party of Socialism and Liberty

PST Partido Social Trabalhista Social Labor Party

PSTU Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado United Socialist Workers' Party

PT do B Partido Trabalhista do Brasil Labor Party of Brazil

PT Partido dos Trabalhadores Workers' Party

PTB Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro Brazilian Labor Party

PTC Partido Trabalhista Crist�o Christian Labor Party

PTN Partido Trabalhista Nacional National Labor Party

PV Partido Verde Green Party

TSE Tribunal Superior Eleitoral Electoral Supreme Court

Ordinary theories of coalitions are often applied to the study of government formation under parliamentarism, the only level of analysis being the legislature. In the electoral context under presidentialism, however, such analysis needs to be adapted to reflect the interactions between executive and congressional candidates.1 The incentives at various levels are not the same, and any proposed theoretical framework should allow for this variation.

This article studies the motivations party leaders have, under presidentialism, to form "minimum winning" electoral coalitions-alliances that cease to be winning if one member is subtracted (Riker 1962). Under what conditions do they form? What kinds of parties do they comprise? Do coalitions for president interfere with those for Congress? Brazil is an excellent case study because concurrent elections stimulate political actors' strategic coordination (Samuels 2000a, b, 2003; Power and Mochel 2008) and electoral alliances are allowed. In this context, coalition theory needs to be explored thoroughly, enclosing the races for president (national level), federal deputy (federal district level), and governor (district level); therefore, a three-level game.

In 2002 and 2006, moreover, Brazil's Electoral Supreme Court (TSE) obliged those parties with presidential candidates to replicate the presidential electoral arrangement in the district. Under this judicial decision, known as verticalization, parties with presidential candidates could not form alliances with rival parties in the concurrent legislative and gubernatorial elections. This study argues that verticalization pushed party leaders to form minimum winning electoral coalitions. They faced a strategic dilemma: whether to run a presidential candidate, having to replicate the electoral agreement, or to abstain from the presidential race, thus remaining free to decide on the parties with which they would form alliances in the district. This new rule forced national party bosses to reconsider the potential contributions of each possible ally (as well as the concessions involved) in the elections for president, federal deputy, and governor (Sousa 2006; Fleischer 2007).