Closing the deal

Radical Society, Jul 2002 by Tate, Winifred

the death of democracy in colombia

"WE SPENT OUR LIVES PREPARING for a military dictatorship; we never expected an authoritarian government to be popularly elected." Renowned Colombian human rights lawyer Gustavo Gallon was speaking before the May 26 election of Colombia's new president, Alvaro Uribe. His new administration's hardline approach, the February 2002 collapse of peace talks between the government and the largest guerrilla group and Colombia's increasing insertion into the global war against terrorism make a solution to the 40-year-old internal conflict harder to imagine than ever. "What is hardest for us is that the human rights situation is getting worse," Gallon said during the March UN Human Rights Commission meetings, "while people are turning against even the idea of human rights."

To understand how Uribe will govern, it is helpful to look at his history. Uribe built his career in Antioquia, one of Colombia's most populous, prosperous, and violent departments, infamous as home of the Medellin cartel (named for the department's capital city), and has served as mayor, senator, and governor. His "efficient government" program has focused on privatization of public services and his proposals for political reform, on dissolving Congress. Most controversial by far have been allegations of his links with the paramilitaries. Uribe has long advocated more civilian participation in military operations, plans that critics fear could strengthen the illegal paramilitary groups. During his tenure as governor, Uribe was an enthusiastic supporter of rural security cooperatives known as Convivir. Convivir involved civilians carrying out armed patrolling and intelligence functions under the control of local military commanders. Critics charged that their efforts essentially legalized the creation of paramilitary groups, outlawed in 1989. The Convivir were widely criticized by human rights groups for involving the civilian population in the conflict, committing abuses, and working with established illegal paramilitary forces.1 Uribe remains close with the military, notably two generals dismissed in 1998 for alleged links with paramilitary abuses. Uribe was keynote speaker at a 2001 dinner in their honor.2

Before the election, Uribe was called "the paramilitary candidate" and, although paramilitaries did not officially endorse any candidates, a communique on the United Self-Defense Forces' (AUC) website, the national umbrella organization for paramilitary groups in Colombia, stated: "[should] the Alvaro Uribe administration arrive at the presidency, [it] would benefit the great majority of Colombians."3 Uribe has also been plagued by accusations of links with drug trafficking in the 1980s, claims he vigorously denies. Uribe maintains that his connections to the infamous Ochoa drug cartel family were limited to thoroughbred horse shows, a popular upper-class sport in Antioquia for which the Ochoas were famous. He also denied allegations that part of his campaign funds originated in Pablo Escobar's neighborhood development project, "Medellin without Slums."4

Since his election, Uribe has announced - but produced no detailed plans - for two new programs, the "Million Friends," and "Peasant Soldiers." The first involves informants working with the army, the second will give peasants arms to fight with local military battalions while they remain in their communities. Both have been widely criticized as involving the civilian population in the conflict, and paving the way for further paramilitary abuses. Uribe declared a state of "internal commotion" (Colombia's state of siege) on 11 August, and issued Decree 2002 shortly thereafter. Among other special provisions, this decree allows the Armed Forces as well as the DAS and other judicial agencies to carry out searches, wiretapping, and communications interception, capture and detention with only "verbal communication" from judicial authorities of authorization. This decree also establishes "rehabilitation and consolidation" zones, to be defined by the president. In these zones, residents must register with a specially designated military commander, the right to travel is restricted, and the governor can essentially declare suspect individuals under house arrest.

Although Colombia claims to be Latin America's oldest democracy, the majority of Colombians do not participate in political life, by choice or by force. Political violence as well as formal electoral procedures have both been used to keep third parties from power and block efforts for reform. A power-sharing agreement between the two strongest parties from 1957 to 1974 excluded all alternative parties and contributed to widespread frustration with the political system for much of the past fifty years. Political scientists have characterized the Colombian system as "elitist pluralism" (Bailey), "exclusionary democracy" (Pecaut), "democradura" (Leal), and a "limited democratic consociational" arrangement (Hartlyn).5 In the most recent Congressional elections, only 38 percent of eligible voters cast their ballots. Despite an increase in "opinion voting" (i.e., supporting candidates for their platform and position), traditional "clientalist vote trading" for personal favors, jobs, or cash remains widespread. Political violence has also thwarted political participation. In the 1980s, paramilitary attacks killed more than two thousand members of the Patriotic Union, a left movement born out of frustrated peace talks. This history and the ongoing attacks against both demobilized guerrillas and reformist leftist candidates make voters reluctant to mobilize.