Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa

African Studies Review, Apr 2009 by Pitcher, Anne, Moran, Mary H, Johnston, Michael

Abstract:

Current usages of the terms patrimonial and neopatrimonial in the context of Africa are conceptually problematical and amount to a serious misreading of Weber. His use of the term patrimonial delineated a legitimate type of authority, not a type of regime, and included notions of reciprocity and voluntary compliance between rulers and the ruled. Those reciprocities enabled subjects to check the actions of rulers, which most analyses of (neo) patrimonialism overlook. We apply these insights to a case study of Botswana and suggest that scholars reconsider the application of Weber's concepts to African states.

Introduction

Is "neopatrimonialism" a pathology, analogy, cause, effect - or a term for all of Africa's troubles? How is it linked to Weber's notion of patrimonial authority, and what parts of it, precisely, are "neo"? Is it an attribute of most African states only, or are its causes and consequences generalizable to other countries and regions of the world? Indeed, given its myriad uses by scholars, does the term neopatrimonialism retain any analytical utility at all? We argue that the answer to that last question is "yes" - but that the meaning and its implications can be surprising.

We begin with a survey of the uses and misuses of neopatrimonialism as an idea, and of the analytical and policy consequences that may flow from its abuse. We then return to Weber to explore the core concept of patrimonial authority. Our focus - like Weber's over a century ago - is on the contrasting ways rulers may establish legitimate authority by securing consent (compliance) from their subjects. Throughout the analysis we draw a distinction between types of authority and types of regime - the latter referring to the means by which positions of power are filled in a state and the degree to which citizens are allowed to participate in that process. Larry Diamond's classification (2002), extending from liberal democracies to politically closed authoritarian regimes, embodies well our understanding of regime types. We suggest that many applications of neopatrimonialism wrongly assume a direct causal connection between types of authority and types of regime, or even treat the two as synonymous. To illustrate the fundamental difference between the two, and to illustrate the critical role of human agency in shaping both, we examine the case of Botswana, where a modern democratic state has been erected on historical foundations of patrimonial authority. We conclude by exploring some implications of our analysis, arguing that a misreading of Weber has turned African countries into examples of an imagined common pathology and caused a mistaken identification of this pathology with a type of legitimacy or authority. As deGrassi (2008) has noted, too often the term neopatrimonialism is invoked in the absence of detailed historical and ethnographic attention to particular times and places. Scholars consequently ignore variations in the interactions of power and accountability within African states that might lend themselves to insightful comparisons with countries elsewhere.

Diverse Roots of Legitimacy

For Weber, patrimonialism was not a synonym for corruption, "bad governance," violence, tribalism, or a weak state. It was instead a specific form of authority and source of legitimacy. Weber (1947 [1922]) defined power (Macht) as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests" (152).1 While he understood such power as pervading all human interactions, he was fascinated with how certain structural positions were allocated the right to expect compliance by others - or "the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons" (1947[1922]:152). Almost all structural subordinates retain some power to resist or subvert the desires of those in authority, but they also agree that certain individuals are entitled to their obedience. WTeber's ideal types, describing the cultural variations with which this compliance with authority could be constructed, attempted to examine how the dominated understand, participate in, and even celebrate their domination. Going well beyond Marx's ideas of mystification or false consciousness, Weber tried to catalog the diverse ways in which the legitimate exercise of power could be culturally framed.

In patrimonial societies, which have existed in many places outside Africa, what we would call the state was indeed the personal domain of one or a few leaders. But in many such places significant legitimacy was derived from an aspect of patrimonialism that is now frequently overlooked. These were reciprocities that helped cement patrimonial authority. Such reciprocities - personal, densely interwoven, often lopsided, and based on intangible and symbolic dynamics of status, loyalty, and deference as much as on material exchange - became the means by which rulers sought obedience from the ruled. Even if those reciprocities did not rest upon contemporary distinctions between the public and the private, or employ formal mechanisms of accountability and transparency, where they were sustained through voluntary compliance they constituted a system of legitimate authority.