WINGS OF DENIAL: THE ALABAMA AIRGUARD IN THE BAY OF PIGS, THE

Alabama Heritage, Winter 2005 by Trest, Warren, Dodd, Don

THE SIXTY GUARDSMEN, CERTAIN THAT THEY WERE THE RIGHT MEN FOR THE JOB, VOLUNTEERED TO "GO SOUTH" IN 1961 UNDER TERMS OF ABSOLUTE SECRECY. NOT EVEN THEIR FAMILIES KNEW WHERE THEY WERE GOING.

AS PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY took the oath of office in 1961, he inherited from the Eisenhower administration a risky covert operation plan. Well underway by this time, the plan involved a CIA initiative to arm, train, and aid Cuban exiles in the overthrow of Fidel Castro's communist dictatorship. Receiving understated risk assessments and conflicting advice from all sides, Kennedy grew nervous about the planned invasion-fearful that America's involvement would become known to the world. He began to alter the plans, insisting that America be able to "plausibly deny" any part in the coup. Kennedy's tinkering, among other things, created the embarrassing and costly event remembered in history as the "Bay of Pigs." Though Kennedy eventually had to acknowledge America's involvement in the disastrous affair, he steadfastly denied that American military personnel had invaded the Cuban nation. Not until 1998 did CIA officials publicly acknowledge the role that eight Air National Guard members had played at the Bay of Pigs to support beleaguered Cuban resistance troops. All eight men were from Alabama. Only four came home.

In 1960, during the heat of the Kennedy-Nixon election campaign, Alabama's Governor John Patterson had approved a request by General Reid Doster, commander of the Alabama Air Guard, to recruit Air Guard personnel to assist the CIA. Their mission was to train and advise the pilots of the resistance force, to fly transport missions, and to arm and maintain the planes. The Cuban exiles were to execute the invasion.

Exiled Cuban pilots would fly B-26 Douglas Invaders, painted to look like those used in Castro's air force. Invasion planners hoped that the Cuban population would believe that Castro's own pilots were in revolt against him, inspiring the people to join the invasion force in a mass uprising. The Alabama Air Guard had been chosen because they were the last American military unit to fly and maintain the obsolete B-26.

In all, there were sixty Alabamians recruited as CIA civilian-contract personnel and sent to Central America to train the Cuban exiles in 1961. Most of the recruits lived within fifteen miles of the Birmingham airport and had followed a similar path toward their moment in history: service in the Air Force as aircraft mechanics, employment by Hayes Aircraft, time as "weekend warriors" in the Alabama Air Guard, and finally service as full-time Air Guard technicians. A close-knit group, they were "good ole boys" in its best sense-pulling their own weight and refusing to let a tough task beat them. The sixty guardsmen, certain that they were the right men for the job, volunteered to "go south" in 1961 under terms of absolute secrecy. Not even their families knew where they were going.

Wearing civilian clothes for the duration, the Alabamians began to deploy in small groups to a training base in Guatemala. They worked hard to prepare the Cuban resistance flight crews, developing strong friendships that solidified their commitment to the mission. Operations Officer Joe Shannon saw the group as Cold War warriors trying to keep communism from gaining a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. It would be the Spring of 1961 when their part in the Cold War suddenly got hot.

The original plan called for CIA-supported radio transmissions into Cuba, encouraging an uprising. The propaganda war would be followed by a daytime invasion near Trinidad-a city known for its anti-Castro activities. Should the mission fail, the resistance fighters would be able to disappear into the nearby Escambray Mountains and elude capture.

The CIA had been honing the plan for a year, but Kennedy thought it was too "noisy" and insisted on changes. The revised plan called for a night invasion of a more obscure region-la Bahia de Cochina, or "the Bay of Pigs." The bay had an airstrip, which appealed to Kennedy because, in theory, it would allow for most of the air strikes to take off from Cuban soil. But swamps surrounded the bay, precluding any way of escape for the liberation forces should something go wrong with the mission.

According to the plan, sixteen B-26s, manned by Cuban resistance crews, were to completely disable Castro's air force in a series of bombing raids on April 15 and 16-a critical element to the success of the coming land invasion. The landing force, ammunition, and plane fuel would arrive in the bay on board five merchant vessels before dawn on April 17. The resistance troops would then take the beachhead and the airstrip. But under Kennedy's orders, only eight B-26s made the journey on April 15, and none were allowed to follow to "clean up" anything that remained as an air threat. As a result, only half of Castro's planes were destroyed; the other half was ready and waiting for the invasion force as it made its way to the beachhead on April 17.