ALABAMA'S VINE AND OLIVE COLONY

Alabama Heritage, Summer 2006 by Blaufarb, Rafe

Why did Congress lavish such favor on a group of foreign expatriates? Such largesse was not without political risk. Prominent national newspapers were quick to criticize this unprecedented generosity. Prophesying failure in 1817, the Columbian Centinel of Boston ridiculed the French-and unwittingly helped plant the seeds of the tenacious myth of French aristocrats floundering in the wilderness. "Made up of princes, generals, legislators, counts, school masters, and scholars-bred in the refinements of luxury and many of them advanced in years, we are confident they will find themselves better qualified to shine in a court in Paris than in a forest." Several Alabama newspapers such as the Huntsville Republican and the Alabama Democrat also made dire predictions of speculation. By "inconsiderately granting to a company of foreigners 92,000 acres of the choicest selections" warned the Republican's editorialist in April 1818, Congress was playing into the hands of "French speculators" who would sell out to American newcomers at "an incredible price." In a short time, there would be no "extensive vineyards," just cotton fields.

What prompted Congress to brave this storm of protest was a set of strategic considerations that boiled down to this imperative: the United States had to solidify its hold on the Gulf Coast. The recently concluded War of 1812 had revealed that control of this region was critical not only to the security of the southern states, but also essential if the nation was to survive as a unified polity. Not only had the British tied down thousands of American troops by a skillful guerilla campaign they mounted from the sanctuary of Spanish Florida, they had also come close to bringing the trans-Appalachian west to its knees by capturing New Orleans. Since the economic existence of the West depended on its ability to ship goods down the Mississippi River for export through that port, it followed that whichever power controlled New Orleans would be in a position to exert irresistible pressure on that region and, ultimately, determine its destiny. Although General Jackson had saved the city from British occupation in 1815, it had been a brush with disaster that far-thinking American political leaders did not want to repeat. In the years immediately following the war, the government made determined efforts to encourage settlement in the Gulf Coast region to firm up the American presence there by creating demographic "facts on the ground." One such attempt was the creation of the Vine and Olive Colony.

But in American strategic thinking, increasing the Gulf Coast population was not the only purpose the Vine and Olive Colony served. Located on heights above the juncture of the Tombigbee and Black Warrior Rivers, it controlled a critical choke-point on navigable rivers that flowed into Mobile Bay. Already in 1817 American planners had concluded that one way to end the West's dangerous dependence on New Orleans would be to develop a great system of canals, locks, and dams that would allow uninterrupted water travel from the Tennessee River to the port of Mobile. The Tombigbee River was to form a large section of the projected waterway. Although this dream was not fully realized until 1984, with the opening of the Tenn-Tom waterway, this vision lay behind Congress's decision to make the Vine and Olive grant.