Protection of Maritime Assets And Port Security

Sea Technology, Feb 2008 by Makrinos, Stephen T

Defending Against Surface and Subsurface Improvised Explosive Device Threats

The majority of anti-terror research and development efforts since September 11, 2001, have focused on land-based improvised explosive device (IED) threats related to military operations in the urban combat environment in Southwest Asia. Subsequent to the USS Cole and MT Limburg tanker incidents and due to the recent increase of pirate attacks in the South China Sea and near the Horn of Africa, the spotlight has focused on seaborne terrorist threats.

Surveillance above the water line relies on closed-circuit television (CCTV), forward-looking infrared (FLIR) and radar. Access control sensors have provided a limited measure of deterrence. Coping with underwater threats via vessel or seafloor-mounted sonar sensors has had very limited success due to the complexity of technical problems and cost. In spite of technological advances and the development of new sensors, what is lacking is a holistic approach to dealing with a problem that encompasses a broad spectrum of domain awareness and post-incident recovery and assessment. Also, organizational changes need to be implemented and a unified command structure established that will coordinate the activities of multiple federal, state and local antiterrorism offices and agencies. This is essential to develop appropriate law enforcement and security responses to the information, data and intelligence collected and assimilated from disparate sources and to effectively allocate resources for maximum effect.

A unified command structure would facilitate the rapid transfer of intelligence information and provide actionable intelligence to strike forces for timely interdiction of potential threats to minimize losses and maintain continuity of operations, whether military or civilian. The first challenge of a task force established under this unified command would be to locate and identify useful evidentiary, tactical information as input for a strategic analysis. Very large quantities of electronic, printed and, in some cases, handwritten data must be searched electronically for content and informational value. The next challenge would be to retrieve useful information, regardless of source or format, and convert it for strategic analysis.

The U.S. government collects and processes a tremendous amount of threat-related intelligence information, but it is scattered across an incredible number of unrelated data systems and databases. Much of the information is duplicative, but unique data treasures still exist. Analysts need access to this data to mine the resources without duplicating the effort. The task force must therefore identify suites of tools that allow analysts to sift the large amounts of data in and out of computer-based systems. Technical implementation of this goal must consider information system standards for the federal government, the intelligence community, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland security and the private sector.

Approach

The asymmetric and inherently unpredictable nature of the insurgent IED threat, whether encountered by the military in an urban combat environment, naval vessels at their ports of call or commercial vessels during normal trade operations, demands a holistic full-spectrum approach. The Department of Defense Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization task force has defined a multifaceted strategy proceeding from prediction/preemption through prevention, detection, neutralization and mitigation. To encompass homeland defense and address the protection of maritime assets, a task force has to be established under a unified command structure that will provide a closed loop approach. Two additional elements need to be added to those mentioned above to provide IED defense and countermeasures.

The first is broad-spectrum domain awareness (threats/vulnerabilities, current situation and all-source fused intelligence), which is an enabler for defensive countermeasures. The second is post-incident recovery and assessment to ensure rapid capture of information and lessons learned and to keep awareness fully current.

Developing counter-IED solutions that implement this holistic strategy for the warfighter or for the protection of maritime assets and homeland defense in a timely, effective way demands an agile, quick-reaction life cycle approach. One significant characteristic of terrorists is their ability to rapidly adapt their tactics, techniques and procedures to counter the effects of countermeasures applied against their IEDs. The development of predictive techniques that utilize a variety of data collected from disparate systems and sensors, as well as open-source information that can be fused to provide actionable intelligence, is required.

Technology Thrusts

Port security needs have been addressed thus far primarily through persistent surveillance techniques that integrate CCTV and/or FLIR cameras in conjunction with radar systems to monitor surface traffic. These are augmented by the use of smart cards and retinal-scan cameras to protect sensitive port areas.