Turkish Labyrinth: Ataturk and the New Islam, The

Middle East Policy, Jun 1998 by Lombardi, Ben

It is true that there was a hard core of support for Refah, but the actual size of that base remains very difficult to judge. In a September 1997 poll, only 65 percent of those who supported the party in 1995 stated that they would continue to do so in a new parliamentary election.7 The same poll indicated that among the reasons given for supporting Refah, Islam may be only the backdrop, not the most important: "corruption and bribery, 19.2 percent; the battle against inflation, 17.4 percent; unfair distribution of income, 12.3 percent; unemployment, 12.2 percent; lack of security for the future, 10 percent." It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that Refah may have drawn strength from a protest vote against the very evident inadequacies of the mainstream parties. After all, Erbakan never won a parliamentary majority. Refah formed the government only after the collapse of the Motherpath coalition (Motherland and True Path parties) caused by the personal political squabbling of the two leaders, current premier Mesut Yilmaz and Mrs. Qiller. Moreover, some DYP deputies who had grudgingly supported Ciller's coalition with Refah were never happy about her inability (or unwillingness) to actively oppose Erbakan's agenda. Many thought that Qiller had struck a Faustian bargain with Erbakan whereby Refah would prevent a parliamentary inquiry into her financial dealings, and she, in turn, would acquiesce to the Islamist program. In the weeks before Refah's fall on June 18, 1997, tiller's DYP caucus suffered numerous defections, as those deputies distanced themselves from the coalition government and the accusations of corruption leveled against Ciller.

Given Refah's recent (January 16, 1998) proscription by the Constitutional Court, time alone will tell if any new Islamist party will obtain the same or greater levels of electoral support. But, even if the newly formed Virtue party does succeed in holding the majority of Refah supporters, it will still not have sufficient electoral numbers to form a government without building another coalition. Given the hostility of the armed forces' leadership to Refah, it is difficult to imagine that any of the mainstream parties would be willing to link themselves with the Islamist agenda of Refah's successor.

All that said, it is important not to underrate the changes Turkey is currently undergoing, and Pettifer's book is very good at making the reader aware of these. The growing public profile of Islam in Turkish society predates the political turmoil of the past few years. Indeed, the latest resurgence of Islam was sponsored originally by the military as a means of reconciling a fractured nation following the coup in 1980. Since then, the growth of Islam has been very public. Religious publications and media, the creation of an Islamist business organization (MUSIAD), compulsory religious education, and the building of mosques throughout the country testify to this growth. In fact, the democratization of Turkish politics has also assisted in bring Islam into the open as politicians have been required to address (or, perhaps more accurately, play to) the religious aspirations of the electorate.8 Some efforts are now underway, particularly in limiting (if not removing) the influence of the Imam schools. It is difficult to believe, however, that the Islamist influence can be so easily contained.