Turkish Labyrinth: Ataturk and the New Islam, The

Middle East Policy, Jun 1998 by Lombardi, Ben

The re-Islamicization of Turkish society and the evidence for that process is, therefore, quite evident. But does that mean that all of Turkish society is about to be enwrapped in a green banner? Do the changes underway inevitably lead to an Islamicized, if not an Islamic, republic? In Pettifer's book, the answers to these questions are never made explicit, although he seems to be suggesting that the momentum in Turkey to recover its pre-republican heritage is building. This trend is obviously propelled by the tremendous economic disparities in the country. The poor, the urban squatters, the intellectuals and many conservatives all now see Islam answering the questions life makes so difficult. As Pettifer notes, "The revolution can be made in small ways without a major confrontation with the state and the army"(p.48), and Refah gained millions of supporters by its careful attention to the basic needs of the ordinary people.

Nevertheless, perhaps we should not become too exercised about these developments. Over thirty years ago, Bernard Lewis wrote that "the deepest Islamic roots of Turkish life and culture are still alive, and the ultimate identity of Turk and Muslim in Turkey is still unchallenged."9 As in its provision of a more traditional value system, it is possible to see Refah filling a gap that the Turkish authorities cannot. Islam is addressing a perceived need by a large segment of society for balance. One Turkish academic noted that her country "has gone so far in the Kemalist direction that many people think it's time for some balance in the other direction," and remarked on the need for a "synthesis of secularism and Islam."'o It is this quest that constitutes the essential tension in Turkey's future, the confrontation between those who see Kemalist ideology as fundamental to the Turkish state and the not inconsiderable number who believe that Islam offers better answers to some of the problems of modern life.

Pettifer seems reluctant to lead his reader to a conclusion that would suggest an Algeria-like scenario developing in Turkey. Such a concern is not unwarranted. In 1993, in Sivas, 37 secular intellectuals were burned to death in their hotel by a mob angered by their anti-Islamic views." This is an isolated incident, so far. At a more political level, Erbakan and other Refah leaders openly talked about their party's Islamist principles ruling Turkey. Indeed, the Refah leader once referred to the party as an "Islamic Jihad Army." In early February 1997, at a gathering in the city of Sincan, Refah supporters enthusiastically cheered the Iranian ambassador's call for the imposition of the Sharia. The armed forces responded the very next day by sending a column of armored vehicles through the city's main center and forced the recall of the ambassador. Since then, the Turkish armed forces have altered the national-security doctrine, establishing the international threat posed by so-called reactionary (i.e., Islamic and national-separatist) elements as the most pressing. The military high command has also frequently stated that it will not permit Turkey to go the way of Algeria, suggesting that the image is in the thoughts of senior commanders. But what is the likelihood of such an occurrence? At present, it seems improbable. By the grudging acceptance of its banning, Refah has yet again demonstrated its willingness to "play the political game" by the rules. Moreover, Turkish Islam has, by all accounts, always been heavily influenced by mysticism, expressed in the great dervish orders that have also become more visible.12 This type of religion appears far less stark and violence-prone than other Middle Eastern derivations of Islam. If, however, the forces of secularism adamantly oppose any compromises with Islamic political forces, it is possible that a more radical strain might emerge.