Turkish Labyrinth: Ataturk and the New Islam, The

Middle East Policy, Jun 1998 by Lombardi, Ben

With the events of June 1997 in mind, when the military forced Refah from office, one might ask what role the Turkish armed forces play in Pettifer's portrait? Overall, it is not a positive one. For supporters of the current regime, the military is a necessary political firewall against the subversion of the existing political order. Four times (1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997), it has intervened to oust a government, either for inadequacies or because, as in 1960 and 1997, it was actively promoting political Islam. Pettifer's view of the armed forces is, however, far more critical. He criticizes them for being too detached from Turkish society and notes that they "have inherited some of the traditional Ottoman military's aristocratic disdain for any kind of commercial or business activity" (p. 18). He argues that their social status is largely undeserved, as they have never been involved in any serious test "where the defence of their country was at stake" (p. 64). Lastly, he views the form of national identity being taught in the barracks as "conformist, thuggish and virtually racist and Fascist" (p. 66). In other words, the Turkish armed forces are too undemocratic, too powerful and far too politicized.

Pettifer's description of the Turkish military is of some worth. Alone among the NATO allies, they are largely insulated from effective civilian control. They are, in effect, a state within a state, enjoying high social prestige and obtaining the allocation of substantial public resources. (Currently, the Turkish armed forces are following a massive 30-year modernization program worth $150 billion.) Their political power derives from their reputation for discipline and commitment, as well as a constitutionally-mandated oversight function that is provided by the National Security Council (MGK). Under Article 118 of the current constitution, the MGK is responsible for the "existence and independence of the state, [and] the integrity and indivisibility of the country." It is difficult to imagine what types of public activities might not fall under such a sweeping mandate, if the MGK so wished. Moreover, the armed forces have a clear majority of votes on the council. Chaired by the president, five of the eight members are senior military commanders: the chief of the General Staff, and the four force commanders (Army, Air Force, Navy and Gendarme). The other three members are the premier, and the ministers of foreign affairs and internal affairs. It was through the MGK that Erbakan was forced from office in June 1997. Responsible only to the constitution, which they interpret, the armed forces are largely able to set the terms of their own relationship with the country's civilian authorities. As a result, any government must always take into account the wishes of the military commanders.

For those of us who live in one of the Anglo-American democracies, it is difficult not to be somewhat unsettled by such sweeping powers in the hands of the military. Both the British and American civil-military traditions are rooted in a profound distrust of standing armies. Indeed, liberal democratic civil-military relations are so much a part of the political culture of our countries, that it is often difficult to consider the legitimacy or necessity of other approaches. But other systems do exist, and they are a product of very different historical experiences.