Turkish Labyrinth: Ataturk and the New Islam, The

Middle East Policy, Jun 1998 by Lombardi, Ben

If one steps back, it quickly becomes clearer that the role of the Turkish armed forces is not so different from what they have been for centuries. Ottoman sultans, even Suleyman the Magnificent (1520-66), relied on their armies to govern, and several were toppled by the famous and once-feared Janissary Corps.'3 Moreover, if the armed forces were among the most conservative and reactionary institutions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they were frequently also the engine for change within the Ottoman world. The efforts of the reforming sultans of the nineteenth century focused on the military, with the result that a whole generation of officers was created dedicated to the "salvation of their state and empire."'4 Western observers even welcomed the decision of the Young Turks and the army to overthrow Abdulhamid II (1876-1908), "a Sultan of the olden past placed amidst modern surroundings," as one contemporary Canadian described him.'5 The "progressive" role performed by the armed forces was also embraced at that time by reform-minded Turks:

It was the army, as it is scarcely necessary to state, which secured to the people of the Ottoman Empire the constitutional regime which they now enjoy. Officers and men in various army corps have sworn fidelity to the Constitution, and they will certainly defend the rights of constitutional Turkey against all violations, whether such violations come from within or from without.16

Today, as in Ottoman times, there is a clear overlap in Turkey between military and administrative tasks. This has led one noted expert on modern Turkey, Feroz Ahmad, to ask the question if Turkey is a "military society"? But the role of the armed forces in politics today is as much a symptom as a cause, although Pettifer does not seem to recognize this. The paucity of political leadership in Turkey has led many to think that partisan goals have taken precedence over the national interest. This was particularly evident in 1996, when the Motherpath coalition collapsed. But it is in this environment that the military has come to believe, almost by default, that they best represent the nation. Today, the armed forces view the protection of the secular order bequeathed by Ataturk as a principal responsibility. Attacks on the regime, such as that for which Refah was condemned, represent a rejection of the republican tradition. Pettifer might very well be correct in saying that the military mind-set in Turkey is today manufacturing conspiracies, but the rise of political Islam and the absence of alternate civilian leaders will only reinforce the attitudes of those in the armed forces who are firmly committed to the regime.

It is a measure of how careful one must be in discussing Turkish affairs that, in his treatment of a supposedly monolithic organization such as the military, Pettifer must also qualify his remarks. If commitment to Kemalism is a hallmark of the professional officer corps, Pettifer also notes that military life is extremely difficult for ordinary service members. The unaccustomed discipline and the required obedience to a strict hierarchy can only breed a sense of surreal remoteness in the average serviceman's mind. This problem is undoubtedly magnified many times for the unsophisticated conscript, whose background lies in one of Turkey's innumerable rural villages. It is in this context that Pettifer's comment that "[i]t is not uncommon to see fellow soldiers reading the Koran in the barracks" (p. 54) deserves further study. How far has the new Islam penetrated the institution most dedicated to preventing an Islamic resurgence? In 1997, several officers were expelled from the armed forces for openly espousing Islamic beliefs. Although this may give some satisfaction to Kemalist officers, one is left to wonder what they were doing there in the first place, after years of professional military service. Moreover, the effectiveness over time of the armed forces as a firewall against sectarianism is questionable, particularly because it is a conscript army and must draw its troops from those sectors of society most avidly embracing the new Islam. As Mehmet Ali Birand noted, "[t]he Turkish Army is part of the Turkish people and its mirror image. As a result, the contradictions, the maladies and the backwardness that afflict Turkish society afflict the army too."17