new Arab media phenomenon: Qatar's Al-Jazeera, The

Middle East Policy, Jun 2001 by Bahry, Louay Y

AL-JAZEERA'S POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Several Arab countries have expressed outrage at al-Jazeera and have held Qatar responsible for the programs it airs. While some Arab governments have chosen to register protests with the Qatari government, others have closed al-Jazeera offices in their countries and sent its personnel and correspondents home. In some cases, Arab countries have recalled their ambassadors to show their dissatisfaction with the TV station. Examples can be found from Morocco to Kuwait.22 Jordan, for example, closed the offices of al-Jazeera in Amman from November 1998 to February 1999 after a guest on a debate program criticized the regime and stated his views of what the Jordanian people thought of their government.

In the first week of May 2000, the Qatari government heard complaints from three Arab countries at the same time: Iraq, Libya and Tunisia. Iraq was protesting al-Jazeera coverage of the extravagant celebrations of Saddam Hussein's birthday while Iraq claimed that its people were dying from hunger because of U.N. sanctions. At the same time, Tunisia and Libya protested the fact that al-Jazeera hosted opponents of their regimes, and both recalled their ambassadors. In June 1999 a case arose that shocked the Persian Gulf countries. In a telephone call to a talk show, a viewer (presumably an Iraqi) criticized the emir of Kuwait, Jabir alAhmad Al Sabah. The Kuwaiti government took his words as a personal insult to the ruler and ordered the closure of the al-- Jazeera offices. The Kuwaiti minister of information visited Qatar to express his government's outrage.

In these and similar cases, the Qatari reply has generally been that while the government of Qatar respects and sympathizes with this or that country, it has no direct control over the programs because al-Jazeera is privately owned. Tension between al-Jazeera and various countries usually calms down after a time, and the "offended" country begins to deal with the station once again. Al-Jazeera has become so powerful, valuable and influential that it is difficult for any given Arab country to boycott it permanently.

AL-JAZEERA'S FINANCES

To enable al-Jazeera to function independently of the Qatari government, in 1996, Emir Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani granted the station a one-time donation of 500 million Qatari riyals ($137 million). The hope was that al-Jazeera would be able to establish itself and become financially independent within five years. Al-- Jazeera was supposed to attract sufficient income from commercial advertisements to function autonomously. All indications are, however, that al-Jazeera has failed to generate sufficient income and is still receiving financial aid from the government.23 Like the rest of the Arabic satellite TV channels, al-Jazeera is very secretive about its budget. In the absence of official statistics, one can only attempt to estimate its cost of operations. The estimated fee for renting the use of satellite transponders is about $4 million; the cost of producing programs must then be added. Production itself runs into tens of millions of dollars. The station has offices all over the world; in mid-May 2000 it had 497 journalists, broadcasters and staff on the payroll. One can only agree with the specialists on the subject, who claim that al-Jazeera could not function on less than $40 million annually.24 However, if al-- Jazeera is still financially dependent on the Qatari government, the director of its administrative board, Shaikh Hamad Bin Themir Al Thani, sees the end of this dependency in the near future. He told me, "I expect that al-Jazeera will be able to finance itself in three or four years."(25)