Transformation of Palestinian Politics - From Revolution to State-Building, The

Middle East Policy, Mar 2002 by Wilcox, Philip

The Transformation of Palestinian Politics - From Revolution to StateBuilding, by Barry Rubin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999. 277 pages with notes, glossary and bibliography. $31.50, paperback.

Barry Rubin's study of the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian politics between 1993 and 1999 is a well-documented, objective and generally sympathetic account of the Palestinians' transition during this period from revolution toward statehood. Rubin was deputy director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies in Israel when his book was published in 1999. He acknowledges his support for a Palestinian state in the preface, and his analysis reflects the mainstream consensus during that time among Israelis and Americans that there was halting, difficult, but real progress toward peace and a twostate solution.

Like other analysts, Rubin, in hindsight, was too optimistic, in view of the later collapse of the peace process and the descent into undeclared war between the new government of Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority. Nevertheless, Rubin's book, which draws on Hebrew, English and Arabic sources, has many strengths. It carefully describes the huge and unprecedented challenges faced by the new Palestinian Authority in 1993 as it struggled to negotiate a peace with Israel, while starting from scratch to build institutions for governing a future state whose boundaries and powers were still undefined. Rubin also describes the complexities of Palestinian politics, the Palestinian leadership and the opposition, and relations with the Arab world. He portrays Arafat's dilemma in trying to accommodate the need for control to demands for democracy, human rights and the rule of law. And he describes the PA's approach to the huge political and diplomatic challenges it faced, including Arafat's shifting tactics for dealing with terrorism by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, an issue at the center of the debate over the breakdown of the Oslo process and the current deep impasse.

Rubin points out that the Palestinian leadership's acceptance of the Oslo principle of mutual recognition and a two-state peace was a result of 50 years of experience. Nevertheless, the transformation from armed struggle by the external PLO and from Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza to limited Palestinian self-government presented staggering new challenges. Neither the PLO "outsiders" from the diaspora nor the "insiders" in the West Bank and Gaza were prepared for self-government when the PA gained its first foothold in Jericho and Gaza in 1994. The diaspora leadership had little concept of governance, and, although "insider" Palestinians admired Israeli democracy, they had little experience in self-government. (Rubin's book does not deal with the pre1993 occupation, during which insider efforts for political mobilization and self-government were systematically repressed by Israel and often discouraged by the exile PLO. All Israeli governments, expecting permanent control, halted local elections, deported or imprisoned popular leaders, both moderates and radicals, installed puppet mayors, censored the press and outlawed nationalist activity.)

Arafat's new PA, while dealing with popular demands for democracy, creating cooperation between "outsider" and "insider" elites, creating institutions of government, and providing public services and economic development, also had the burden of taming violent Islamist factions. These groups rejected Arafat's PA and the Oslo accords, including the obligation to stop violence against Israel. Rubin concludes that on balance "the PA's successes were more important than its failures." He does not discount enormous problems that existed or predict an early breakthrough to peace and a Palestinian state. Nevertheless, he describes the changes that occurred between 1993 and 1999 as "amazing."

Rubin disputes the popular notion that Arafat is a ruthless despot. As the leader of the Palestinian national movement in exile, Arafat built and preserved unity in an ideologically and geographically scattered community. To achieve minimal consensus and preserve his leadership during that era, Arafat had no choice but to maneuver, juggle, dissemble, and compromise, rather than ruling through a rigid hierarchical structure. To preserve unity, Arafat often deferred to the extremists, although Rubin acknowledges that he broke with the radicals in accepting the Oslo accords in 1993.

Rubin believes that Arafat brought his highly erratic and personalized style of leadership to his new role as president of the PA, not only by habit, but also because of the need to restore and preserve unity in a diverse and fractious polity. Thus, Rubin claims, Arafat worked constantly, through compromise, manipulation and balancing, to bring as many Palestinian elements as possible, including adversaries, into the PA structure.

Rubin disagrees with the popular view that Arafat installed a monolithic cadre of "outsiders" on the PA. Although his top lieutenants, Abu Mazen, Abu Ala, Nabil Shaath and Yasser Abd Rabbo, were all from the diaspora, two-thirds of his cabinet ministers, ultimately, were "insiders." Also, although Arafat continued to rely mainly on the Fatah mainstream for support, he included in various PA roles members of opposition groups, including Fatah militants, Hamas and other anti-Oslo radicals, as well as liberals like Hanan Ashrawi and rivals like Feisal Husseini. Arafat used repression at times to silence critics. But Rubin believes his style was more pluralistic and conciliatory than despotic. One negative product of this political style and heavy reliance on patronage to buy loyalty was widespread corruption in the form of monopolies and the diversion of funds to shore up political support.