Future Combat Systems Progress Remains Uncertain

Signal, Nov 2006 by Kenyon, Henry S

Program has met major milestones, but critics worry about cost, technology issues.

The U.S. Army's ambitious program to create a lighter, more mobile, networked and lethal force is facing budget cuts and concerns that the complex initiative may not be fully deployed. A recently released Congressional Budget Office report examines Future Combat Systems within the context of the Army's transformation efforts. It highlights the challenges facing the program and provides alternative approaches to modernizing the service's combat brigades.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report was commissioned based on testimony and press reports concerning difficulties the program has encountered, especially in its development schedule and procurement cost, explains Douglas Bush, legislative director in the office of Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D-HI). As a member of the House Committee on Armed Services and the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Rep. Abercrombie initiated the study based on previous experiences with another complex program, the canceled Comanche helicopter. "The concern was if that happened with a single platform [Comanche] that had been touted for so long as being absolutely essential, what are the possible future outcomes for FCS [Future Combat Systems]?" Bush says.

The report is designed to provide subcommittee members with an insight into the cost implications of several different program outcomes. The CBO study was commissioned in early 2005 and released in August 2006. But since 2005. Bush notes, the Army's financial situation has become more critical.

The first recommendation is to develop and procure FCS components focusing on information collection and dissemination. Under this proposal, the Army would develop and procure unattended ground sensors and all lour classes of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) included in the FCS program. It also would develop a less extensive version of the FCS wireless battlefield network and install it in existing armored vehicles. All other FCS components, including manned and unmanned vehicles, the non-line-of-sight launch system and the intelligent munitions system, would be canceled.

The second alternative is to develop components to enhance the Army's long-range strike capability, allowing the service to retain its ability to carry out precision attacks. This option calls for developing and procuring the program's unattended ground sensors and long-range UAVs. The service also would develop the non-line-of-sight launch system and its assorted missiles, retain and upgrade its existing armored vehicles and develop a scaled-down version of the FCS network to link sensors and manned systems.

New vehicle types are the focus of the third proposal. It would permit the Army to develop and procure five types of manned vehicles to replace the oldest of its platforms, the M113 family of vehicles and M109 howitzers. The new vehicles and other existing Army platforms such as Abrams tanks would he upgraded so that they could he integrated into a scaled-down FCS network. All the other parts of the FCS program, specifically all four classes of UAVs, all unmanned ground vehicles, unattended ground sensors, the intelligent munitions system, the non-line-ol-sight launcher and the remaining three types of manned FCS vehicles would he canceled.

The final alternative suggested by the CBO report would be to retain only the network component of the FCS program. This capability would be a scaled-down version of the currently proposed network that would be installed into existing combat vehicles. The report notes that this approach would require the least amount of hardware and would allow the Army's combat brigades to benefit from an evolutionary improvement rather than a wholesale conversion to a new and unproven technology.

Bush notes that these possibilities represent ways to modernixc the Army short of acquiring the entire FCS program. He explains that Congress is concerned that given the Army's other expenses, the service will not he able to afford FCS in its entirety. He adds that short-term requirements such as modularity and unit reset from Iraq will trump modernization on the scale and pace envisioned by FCS.

However. Bush admits that Congress historically has been hesitant to cancel or radically restructure defense programs. "Usually what Congress does is express concern and nibble at the funding until the services get the picture and do it themselves. In this case a possible good outcome would be for the Army to restructure the program under a more realistic path so that it can make an argument for keeping the dollars in the future budget." he says.

As the program currently stands, FCS is scheduled to introduce its initial capabilities for hardware in Spinout 1 and for software in Build I. Both of these phases are interrelated, explains Jack Paul. Boeing's director for FCS strategic business development, Arlington. Virginia. Boeing is the program's prime contractor. Spinout I is a formal part of the program that will begin to inject FCS technologies into the current forces. This phase will see the addition of three platforms: the non-line-of-sight launch system, the intelligent munitions system and the unattended ground sensor. The U.S. Defense Department has set a formal program evaluation for 2008. If procurement is approved, the first six brigade combat teams would be equipped and fielded by 2010. Through its various spinouts, the program seeks ultimately to have a total of 15 fully equipped FCS brigades by 2025. The remainder of the Army's units will be fitted with FCS systems and software, but they will not receive the new manned vehicles.