International marketing in an enlarged European Union: Some insights into cultural heterogeneity in Central Europe*

Journal for East European Management Studies, 2008 by Skinner, Heather, Kubacki, Krzysztof, Moss, Gloria, Chelly, David

Large differences between Czech, Hungarian and Polish respondents exist in terms of observing historic national dates, national family and first names and patriotic songs. A symbol agreed as a contributor to a feeling of national identity by survey respondents in Poland was having a Polish family name (86.8%) and Polish first name (80.8%). The same symbols were agreed by 63.3% and 66.9% Czechs and only by 59.6% and 53.3% Hungarians respectively. Patriotic songs were agreed to contributing to national feelings by 74.4% of survey respondents in Poland and by 70.7% in the Czech Republic. Notably that symbol contributes to a feeling of national identity for fewer respondents in Hungary (54.1%). National dates are important contributors for 65.6% and 69.6% of Czech and Hungarian respondents respectively. However, Polish respondents perceived their role as much more important (84.4%). Look, agreed as contributing to a feeling of Polishness by 73.9% of survey respondents, although offering a significant indicator in Vincent's (1999) work, contributed slightly less to national identity among Czechs (54.6%) and Hungarian respondents (only 33.7%). Those differences might be partially explained by the fact that Polish culture is the most collectivist amongst those three, while Czech culture shows the strongest tendency towards individualism (Kolman et al. 2003). The belief in a common set of national symbols might be correlated with the feeling of collective (national) identity. Making a contribution to the country was agreed as a contributor by 70.3% of survey respondents in the Czech Republic, but only by 49.9% of respondents in Hungary, with Poles falling between those two groups (60.4%). The negative attitude towards that factor might be explained by the years of communist ethic of 'voluntarily work for a country' (the Soviet 'urawnilowka') and shared responsibility (see for example Nasierowski/Mikula 1998). The most significant difference amongst all of the determinants and communicators of national identity was indicated on religion. The answer to Michnik's (2003) question "Who defined the new Poland? Was it the 'Catholic Pole', ethnically and religiously defined?" is positive for 79.9% of Polish respondents. This cannot be a surprise due to the role that the Catholic Church has had in Polish culture for centuries. However, religion plays a role in national identity for only 22.6% of Hungarians and 29.4% of Czechs, which can be explained by the fact that most Czechs and Hungarians are not particularly religious. Moreover, Communist regimes in those countries successfully suppressed any religious tendencies in those nations.

Laitin (2002) believes that the Central and Eastern European nations differ greatly from those in Western Europe. He also believes these peripheral nations are more interested in promoting national culture than those closer to the central "continental norm" of the EU. Survey respondents in Central Europe believed that, in the near future, only 9.6%, 11.1% and 12.6% would see themselves as Hungarian, Polish or Czech (respectively) only, yet 81.9% and 80% of respondents in the Czech Republic and Poland respectively believe they would see themselves as Czech or Polish first, then European. A slightly stronger tendency towards European identity is revealed by Hungarians respondents, as 66.7% believe they would see themselves as Hungarians first, then Europeans in the near future. As the question in the survey asked about the 'near future', it might have been understood in slightly different ways in the researched countries. Kolman et al. (2003) suggests the strongest long-term orientation amongst Hungarians. The much faster economic improvements in Hungary than in the other Central European countries (ibid.) and tendency towards long-term goals might positively affect their attitudes towards European identity. Moreover, Hungary was also identified by Manrai et al. (2001) as the most Westernized of all the Central and Eastern Europe nations, and the most developed of these nations "in terms of economic as well as market development. In fact, Hungary is one of the highest ranking countries in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe" (273).