Cracks in the Iraq coalition but the White House stays on target; A

AS the clock ticks down towards the handover of power in Iraq, reinforcements are waiting in the wings to bolster a sorely tried US coalition still reeling from a week-long succession of calamitous setbacks.

The first will arrive by way of badly needed troops on the ground, to provide cover for the departure of the 1300-strong Spanish contingent. The second comes by way of the revelation that thousands of millions of dollars found their way into Saddam Hussein's pockets from the UN's much criticised oil-for-food programme.

Both have their uses. The soldiers will buy some time for the hard- pressed security forces in Iraq, while the allegations of widespread corruption will give solace to US hawks who are wary of any UN involvement in Iraq.

With 10 weeks remaining before the planned transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi people, the country still has a long way to go before it recovers its equilibrium and the hard facts bring little comfort.

The cost of the operation is running at around $4.7 billion a month, but the returns continue to be meagre. In the last few days suicide bombers in Basra left 68 people dead, many of them children travelling to school; Moqtada al-Sadr's Shi'ite supporters in Najaf are failing to heed demands to hand over their weapons and are threatening to unleash suicide bombers against coalition forces; a senior US commander has admitted that over half of the newly raised Iraqi security forces cannot be trusted and, despite denials from the White House and Downing Street (the usual harbingers of U-turns), it is inevitable that more US and British forces will be deployed into the troubled badlands around Basra and Baghdad.

Coming on top of the release of photographs showing flag-draped coffins at the Dover air force base in Delaware, it has been another uncomfortable week for the Bush administration.

These setbacks mock the claims of US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld that Iraq would be settled and rebuilt quickly and efficiently by small numbers of dedicated forces working in tandem with their allies - in stark contrast to the heavy-handed incompetence of the UN effort in Kosovo in the late 1990s.

According to the hawks in the Bush administration, rapid Iraqification would be the cornerstone of the nation-building, funds from oil revenues would provide the cement while the unelected Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) pointed the way forward to a new democratic beginning. To the dismay of Iraqis and those who opposed the war it has not turned out that way.

Belatedly, the US has recognised that it was wrong to dismantle what remained of Saddam's regime and has started reinstating Ba'ath Party members in an attempt to restore order to the country.

None the less, Iraq's infrastructure is still in a hopeless muddle: its inefficiency remains a major irritant for the population and there is rising anger at the ineptitude of the CPA, now cruelly derided as the organisation that "Can't Provide Anything". And then there is the persistent violence that overshadows every activity - cancelling the many gains made by the US coalition's presence on the ground.

Even for the battle-hardened US Central Command, which is responsible for operations in Iraq, April has been a cruel month. More than 100 soldiers or marines have been killed in combat, mainly as a result of ambushes and urban fighting in the main trouble- spots, or attacks against the lines of communication. The attrition rate has persuaded commanders on the ground to demand the deployment of more foot soldiers to reinforce the 135,000 already there.

In a controversial move, 25,000 soldiers of the experienced 1st Armoured Division have had their tours of duty extended from six to nine months and, according to Pentagon sources, Britain will be asked to supply an additional 1500 troops to take the place of the Spanish contingent that is operating to the north of the UK sector centred on al-Diwaniyah.

If acted upon, this will involve the deployment of an additional two infantry battalions, bringing the British contribution to just over 10,000 troops - a move that could leave the army dangerously overstretched, as the formations will be drawn from the Cyprus garrison and from the "spearhead" battalion which supplies the rapid- reaction force.

Already, British commanders have warned that their position will become unsustainable if they are forced to maintain the deployment cycle without help from willing partners. Ideally, they would like to see the involvement of French or German forces, but this is unlikely unless the operation is turned over to the UN.

With Fallujah and Najaf unsettled, the situation on the ground is causing concern at the very moment when the coalition authorities are keen to end the violence well in advance of the transfer of power. The White House has made it clear that the date, June 30, is non- negotiable. While that has focused minds in the administration led by their envoy Paul Bremer, it is a risky process. The CPA is not trusted, there is a dangerous split in Shia ranks between al-Sadr and the more moderate Ayatollah Ali Husaini Sistani and beyond them lies a worrying mix of potential troublemakers in the Badr Brigade, various militia forces loyal to the Sunnis and - to the north - the Kurdish peshmarga. Any one of these could provide the spark for a nationwide conflagration.