School district financially responsible for disabled student's

Daily Record (Rochester, NY), Jul 26, 2002 by Jill Miller

Is a school district financially responsible for a "disabled" student's tuition at a private school during the pendency of administrative proceedings brought to determine the student's proper academic placement for the school year?

In Pearl and Theodore Murphy v. Arlington Central School District Board of Education, the defendant appealed a decision handed down by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York which determined that the Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. 1415(j), ordered the defendant to assume financial responsibility for the student's tuition until his educational placement changes.

On appeal the school district asserted that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims because plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies.

After a review of the facts, the Second Circuit determined that the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust their "administrative remedies before seeking an injunction in federal court to enforce their son's rights under 1415(j)."

IDEA Framework

The Individual with Disabilities Act is at the center of this case. In order to render a decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals reviewed the statutory framework of IDEA.

The Individuals with Disabilities Act was enacted by Congress "to assure that all children with disabilities have available to them ... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs," Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 68 (1999).

The IEP is the result of a collaboration between parents, educators, and representatives of the school district who, "set out the child's present educational performance, establishes annual and short-term objectives for improvements in that performance, and describes the specially designed instruction and services that will enable the child to meet those objectives."

Parents and students have the opportunity to challenge the school district's decision. In New York State there is a two-tier system of administrative review, N.Y. Educ. Law 4404(1).

During the pendency of the administrative proceedings, IDEA mandates that "unless the state or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then current educational placement of such child ..." 20 U.S.C. 1415(j). "Implicit in [this provision] is the requirement that a school district continue to finance an educational placement made by the agency and consented to by the parent before the parent requested a due process hearing. To cut off public funds would amount to a unilateral change in placement, prohibited by the Act." Zwi D. v. Amach, 694 F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir. 1982)."

The Facts

In July 1998, Arlington Central School District, the defendant, prepared an IEP on Joseph Murphy, the plaintiffs' son, for the upcoming school year. Under Arlington's IEP, Joseph was assigned to Arlington High School.

The plaintiffs objected to this placement and enrolled their son at Kildonan a private school that specializes in the education of disabled students. Joseph attended Kildonan for the entire 1998-1999 school year.

On September 3, 1998, the plaintiffs invoked IDEA's due process procedures. Specifically they challenged Arlington's placement of their son as "inadequate to serve his special education needs and sought reimbursement for the cost of Joseph's tuition at Kildonan for the 1998-1999 school year.

In July 1999 a hearing officer ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded them the cost of Joseph's tuition. The school district appealed the decision in August 1999 to a state review officer. While the appeal was pending the plaintiffs filed a pro se action in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking a temporary restraining order requiring Arlington to fund Joseph's tuition during the pendency of the action.

The district court was unable to determine whether it possessed subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's action before the state administrative process had finished, see Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 1999 WL 980164 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1999).

On December 14, 1999, before the district court settled the jurisdiction issue, the state review officer affirmed the hearing officer's decision and ordered the school district to reimburse the plaintiffs for all tuition expenses incurred for the 1998-1999 school year.

The school district remitted Joseph's 1998 tuition and the district court dismissed plaintiff's case as moot.

However, the school district proposed an IEP placing Joseph at Arlington High School for the 1999-2000 school year. Again the plaintiffs rejected the plan and enrolled their son at Kildonan for the year. The plaintiffs invoked their right to an administrative review of Arlington's 1999 IEP and requested tuition reimbursement for the 1999 school year.

While they continued to pursue their administrative remedies, the plaintiffs filed a motion before the district court seeking an order to compel the defendants to pay Joseph's tuition for the 1999-2000 school year during the pendency of the administrative process.