School district financially responsible for disabled student's

Daily Record (Rochester, NY), Jul 26, 2002 by Jill Miller

The district court held that the state review officer's decision constituted an "agreement by the state that Joseph's current educational placement was Kildonan. The court entered an order requiring Arlington to finance Joseph's education at Kildonan from December 13, 1999, the date the SRO issued its decision with respect to tuition reimbursement for the 1998 school year.

The school district appealed.

Court's Analysis

In order to render a decision, the Second Circuit first reviewed the jurisdictional issue. Were the plaintiffs required to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking an injunction in federal court?

"Before an aggrieved individual may bring an action in state or federal court for a violation of the IDEA, he or she must seek recourse from the administrative procedures established by the statute, see 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(2)," wrote Judge Sonia Sotomayor in the decision for the court. "The plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies ordinarily deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction over any IDEA claims, Hope v. Cortines, 69 F.3d 687, 688 (2d Cir. 1995). The U.S., appearing as amicus curiae, suggests that the exhaustion requirement does not extend to 1415(j), see Cole v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 954 F. Supp. 1214 (M.D. Tenn. 1997)."

Does the exhaustion requirement apply to this case?

"Congress specified that exhaustion is not necessary if (1) it would be futile to resort to the IDEA's due process procedures; (2) an agency has adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general applicability that is contrary to the law or (3) it is impossible that adequate relief can be obtained by pursuing administrative remedies," Judge Sotomayor wrote.

After a review of the evidence the Second Circuit determined that the exhaustion remedy does not apply to this case and that the district court did not err when it exercised jurisdiction over plaintiffs' petition.

The court then turned to the issue of whether IDEA's stay-put provision can form the basis for an award of prospective relief if an "agreement" as to the current educational placement of the child is achieved by operation of law. The court turned to Bd. of Educ. v. Schutz, 290 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2002) a case similar to this one.

"In Schutz, the plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of an IEP that placed their disabled child in public school for the 1999-2000 term," wrote Judge Sotomayor. "The Schutz court therefore ordered the school district to pay the costs of the student's tuition during the pendency of administrative proceedings. As Schutz is factually indistinguishable from the case at bar, we affirm the judgment of the district court and hold that Arlington is financially responsible for Joseph's tuition until such time as Joseph's placement is changed in accordance with the terms of IDEA."

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of injunctive relief.