Circuit court reverses ruling in Owasso school district lawsuit

Journal Record, The (Oklahoma City), Aug 10, 2000

The following summaries of state and 10th District court opinions were compiled by Anthony Sammons.

Oklahoma Court

of Civil Appeals

For the week ended Aug. 7

In the matter of K.L.C., M.M.C., and A.G., alleged deprived children. Angela Chappell vs. State of Oklahoma and K.L.C., M.M.C. and A.G., No. 93,721.

The parental rights of Angela Chappell and her common-law husband, Buddy Godfrey, in their three children were terminated by jury verdict. In her appeal, Chappell claimed error on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. Chappell also claimed that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. Because child dependency hearings equate to criminal trials, the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 2, Section 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution guarantee people accused in criminal prosecutions the right to representation. In Strickland vs. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant's claim that representation was so deficient so as to require reversal must show (1) that the attorney's performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. The court also stated that "judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Relying on these principles, the court reviewed the record, and ruled that the lawyer's representation was not so deficient, as to meet the test of Strickland. As to Chappell's second claim of error, the court ruled that there was sufficient evidence presented by the parties to support the verdict.

Angela Tsotaddle vs. Absentee Shawnee Housing Authority, Jim Murdock, and Absentee Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma, No. 92,410.

This appeal arises from a sexual harassment suit brought by Tsotaddle against Murdock, her former supervisor, and the authority, her former employer. The primary focus of this appeal is the cross- litigation between Murdock and the authority. Murdock filed a cross- petition against the ASHA for terminating his employment following Tsotaddle's complaint against him. Murdock established that the authority failed to hold a hearing to receive evidence on the complaint and to determine the appropriate action. He also established that the authority did not provide him a hearing following termination as set forth in its letter of termination. In defense, the authority contended that it did not have to give Murdock a hearing or a specific cause to terminate him, because his employment was terminable "at-will." The jury rejected the authority's defense and agreed with Murdock that he was entitled to a hearing and a specific cause for termination as part of his employment contract and as a matter of due process. The jury awarded Murdock $75,000 actual damages against the authority, but did not apportion this award between damages for breach of contract and damages for deprivation of due process in violation of Murdock's civil rights.

On appeal, ASHA raised four propositions of error: (1) the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because termination of Murdock's employment did not constitute a breach of any implied contract of employment; (2) the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because the terms of its employment of Murdock did not create a sufficient expectancy of continued employment to give rise to a property interest entitled to constitutional due process protection; (3) the district court erred in denying its motion for new trial, because the damage award was made in error; and (4) the award to Murdock for attorney's fees and costs should be reversed. After reviewing the authority's employment policy, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that contractual rights were created for Murdock's employment under the policy. The court based its decision on the testimony of the authority's executive director, who testified that the ASHA's employment policy did not state that employees were "at-will." Therefore, the court ruled that the trial court did not err, as to issue 1. As to issue 2, the court ruled the same way as issue 1, there was sufficient evidence. The court noted that both letters sent to Murdock contained statements about Murdock's rights to a hearing. The court ruled that a jury could have concluded that these statements were an affirmation of due process rights granted under the provisions of the policy. As to the $75,000 jury award, the court upheld the award, stating, "the verdict must be upheld, because an appellate court has `no right to place limitations upon the amount of damages returned by a jury, unless we are convinced that the amount of recovery bears no relation whatever to the evidence, or that it was induced by bias or prejudice on the part of the jury.'" On the authority's fourth proposition of error, the court ruled that, "under the American Rule, a party is only entitled to the award of attorney fees if authorized by statute or contract." The court stated that the only claim for which a fee was authorized was Murdock's 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim. The court reversed and remanded this issue for the trial court to determine the portion of Murdock's attorney fees that were attributable to the Section 1983 claim.