Federal Court Digests: June 4, 2007

Daily Record, The (Baltimore), Jun 4, 2007

U.S. Supreme Court

Education

Rights of parents under IDEA

BOTTOM LINE: IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights, which are not limited to procedural and reimbursement-related matters but encompass the entitlement to a free appropriate public education for their child.

CASE: Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., No. 05-983 (decided May 21, 2007) (Justices Roberts, Stevens, KENNEDY, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer & Alito) (Justices Scalia & Thomas, concurring in part, dissenting in part).

FACTS: Respondent school district receives federal funds under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (Act or IDEA), so it must provide children such as petitioner Winkelmans' son Jacob a "free appropriate public education," 20 U.S.C. sec. 1400(d)(1)(A), in accordance with an individualized education program (IEP) that the parents, school officials, and others develop as members of the student's IEP Team.

Regarding Jacob's IEP as deficient, the Winkelmans unsuccessfully appealed through IDEA's administrative review process. Proceeding without counsel, they then filed a federal-court complaint on their own behalf and on Jacob's behalf. The District Court granted respondent judgment on the pleadings.

The 6th Circuit entered an order dismissing the Winkelmans' subsequent appeal unless they obtained an attorney, citing Circuit precedent holding that because the right to a free appropriate public education belongs only to the child, and IDEA does not abrogate the common-law rule prohibiting nonlawyer parents from representing minor children, IDEA does not allow nonlawyer parents to proceed pro se in federal court. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

LAW: IDEA's text resolves the question whether parents or only children have rights under the Act. Proper interpretation requires considering the entire statutory scheme. IDEA's goals include "ensur[ing] that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education" and "that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected," 20 U.S.C. sec. sec. 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B), and many of its terms mandate or otherwise describe parental involvement.

Parents play "a significant role," Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, in the development of each child's IEP, see sec. sec. 1412(a)(4), 1414(d). They are IEP team members, sec. 1414(d)(1)(B), and their "concerns" "for enhancing [their child's] education" must be considered by the team, sec. 1414(d)(3)(A)(ii).

A State must, moreover, give "any party" who objects to the adequacy of the education provided, the IEP's construction, or related matter the opportunity "to present a complaint," sec. 1415(b)(6), and engage in an administrative review process that culminates in an "impartial due process hearing," sec. 1415(f)(1)(A), before a hearing officer. "Any party aggrieved by the [hearing officer's] findings and decision [has] the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint." sec. 1415(i)(2)(A).

A court or hearing officer may require a state agency "to reimburse the parents for the cost of [private school] enrollment if the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child." sec. 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). IDEA also governs when and to what extent a court may award attorney's fees, see sec. 1415(i)(3)(B), including an award "to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability," sec. 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).

These various provisions accord parents independent, enforceable rights. Parents have enforceable rights at the administrative stage, and it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to bar them from continuing to assert those rights in federal court at the adjudication stage.

Respondent argues that parental involvement is contemplated only to the extent parents represent their child's interests, but this view is foreclosed by the Act's provisions. The grammatical structure of IDEA's purpose of protecting "the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children," sec. 1400(d)(1)(B), would make no sense unless "rights" refers to the parents' rights as well as the child's. Other provisions confirm this view. See, e.g., sec. 1415(a).

Even if this Court were inclined to ignore the Act's plain text and adopt respondent's countertextual reading, the Court disagrees that sole purpose driving IDEA's involvement of parents is to facilitate vindication of a child's rights. It is not novel for parents to have a recognized legal interest in their child's education and upbringing.

The Act's provisions also contradict the variation on respondent's argument that parents can be "parties aggrieved" for aspects of the hearing officer's findings and decision relating to certain procedures and reimbursements, but not "parties aggrieved" with regard to any challenge not implicating those limited concerns. The IEP proceedings entitle parents to participate not only in the implementation of IDEA's procedures but also in the substantive formulation of their child's educational program.