Legal Opinions - U.S. District Court, Maryland: October 6, 2008

Daily Record, The (Baltimore), Oct 6, 2008

In the instant case, FNC was estopped from denying the validity of the 2005 Agreement as a modification of the prior agreements with existing subscribers at the time it was introduced because such a position was inconsistent with its prior representations, and permitting it to assert such a position would be unconscionable. See Unruh v. Indus. Comm'n of Arizona, 301 P.2d 1029, 1031 (Az. 1956).

Such a denial here was wholly inconsistent with FNC's representations to its users since the introduction of the 2005 agreement that it was the applicable user agreement for all users.

PRACTICE TIPS: Another court formulated the doctrine of quasi estoppel in terms of whether: (1) the offending party took a different position than his or her original position; (2) either the offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party, or the other party was induced to change positions; or (3) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from one he or she had already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. See Atwood v. State, 138 F.3d 310, 314 (Idaho 2006).

Torts

Statute of limitations

BOTTOM LINE: District court granted in part and denied in part auto manufacturers' motions to dismiss class action suit alleging defective seating systems where certain implied breach of warranty claims were time-barred, but other tort-based claims were not.

CASE: Lloyd v. General Motors Corp., et al., USDMD No. 07CV2487 (decided Sept. 11, 2008) (Judge Legg).

FACTS: In June 1999, Timothy and Bernadette Lloyd filed a class action lawsuit in state circuit court against a group of American automobile manufacturers for damages arising from the cost of replacing allegedly defective seating systems.

The Lloyds alleged that the seatbacks in certain of the auto manufacturers' automobiles were unreasonably dangerous because they were unable to withstand the force of a moderate impact rear-end collision. In addition to claims sounding in negligence, strict liability, and a host of other theories, the complaint alleged that the auto manufacturers conspired with one another to, among other things, conceal the defective seating systems in their automobiles from the public.

As originally pled, the Lloyds' complaint named only GM, Ford, and Chrysler as the auto manufacturers, and failed to specify the make and model of the Lloyds' automobile. In July 1999, after the Lloyds amended their complaint to name Saturn as an additional defendant, the various auto manufacturers moved jointly to dismiss the complaint on substantive grounds. In a separate motion, Chrysler and Ford argued that the Lloyds lacked standing to bring a claim against them because they did not own a vehicle manufactured by either company.

In conjunction with their brief opposing the auto manufacturers' motions to dismiss, the Lloyds filed a second amended complaint, in November 1999, adding several new plaintiffs, some of whom allegedly owned Chrysler or Ford vehicles, and stating that the Lloyds themselves owned a 1995 Saturn. The Lloyds then filed a third amended complaint (TAC) later the same day adding a claim for injunctive relief.