Missouri Supreme Court cases deal with meaning of reasonable

St. Louis Daily Record & St. Louis Countian, Mar 12, 2004 by Erin Suess

Police officers should take note of two decisions handed down by the Missouri Supreme Court on Tuesday that clarify what makes up reasonable suspicion and when officers can act on that suspicion.

The suspicions of one police officer conveyed over a police band is reason enough for a second officer to investigate, ruled the state Supreme Court in the case of Missouri vs. Goff, but an officer must act on a reasonable suspicion before issuing a traffic ticket to an offender, not after, held the unanimous court in Missouri vs. Barks.

While the cases had different verdict results, the factors surrounding when an officer can search someone are similar.

In the Barks case, an officer stopped Randy Barks for driving 74 mph in a 55-mph zone. After explaining the ticket to Barks and handing it to him, the patrolman noticed Barks acting nervous. The officer asked him twice why he was nervous and whether he had anything illegal. Barks admitted having a gun in the car and allowed the policeman to get it.

The officer placed Barks in the patrol car and kept him there after learning the gun was legal. The officer asked for permission to search the vehicle and his person; Barks assented to the latter but not the former, on the grounds it wasn't his car.

The officer found tinfoil used to smoke methamphetamine in Barks' pocket and arrested him for possession of paraphernalia. He then asked Barks if there was anything else in the vehicle, to which Barks admitted having a glass smoking bowl. In addition to the bowl, the patrolman found more used tinfoil with methamphetamine residue, a coffee filter and two plastic bags of pseudoephedrine tablets.

The Wayne County Circuit Court convicted Barks of possession of methamphetamine, a class C felony. He appealed, alleging the search, its subsequent finds and his detainment were illegal because they occurred after the lawful purpose of the traffic stop was finished. The state countered, saying that the post-citation conversation was voluntary and that Barks was free to go but chose not to do so.

The high court agreed with Barks, finding the case at bar parallels the 1999 decision State vs. Woolfolk, which held: [T]he basis for the reasonable suspicion must arise within the parameters of the traffic stop itself; suspicions based upon answers to questions asked after the stop is completed are irrelevant to the determination of whether specific, articulable facts supported a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and provided a justification for further questioning once the traffic stop was completed.

The state Supreme Court found that general nervousness alone does not equate to the necessary reasonable suspicion and that Barks couldn't have known he was free to leave after receiving the citation because of the officer's continued interaction with Barks.

During the interrogation that occurred after the patrolman had written the traffic citation, the patrolman positioned himself . . . looking down at Barks. The emergency lights on the patrol car remained activated. Although the patrolman testified that Barks could have driven away after he issued the traffic citation and began asking questions, that option was not apparent from the circumstances. The patrolman did not tell Barks he was free to go, wrote the court.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Barks' position would have understood the situation to be one of custody, added the court, reversing the judgment and remanding the case.

I think that after the officer issues the citation, this opinion fairly well requires the officers to simply stop questioning people and let them go, requiring the police to walk away, explained Poplar Bluff, Mo., attorney John M. Albright, who represented Barks.

I think they [police departments] should be taking notice of this case because often in the past - at least that's the type of cases we've dealt with - is after they've issued a ticket, they continue to detain people, he added.

However, the state Supreme Court did acknowledge that the reasonable suspicions expressed by one officer over a police band can be enough evidence for another officer to conduct an investigatory stop.

In the Goff case, Officer Mitzi Boydston saw Marvin Goff and Patrick Trent parked illegally in a fire lane next to some vending machines in a Wal-Mart parking lot. She asked the dispatcher to run the license plates, and the dispatcher informed Boydston there were no warrants for Goff but said someone living at that [Goff's] address known to operate that car had several outstanding warrants.

By the time Boydston returned to where the car was parked, Goff was gone. She broadcast the information and went looking for Goff. Another officer, Officer Easley, overheard her broadcast and found the car parked next to some vending machines in a Hy-Vee parking lot.

Easley saw Trent open the hood, check to see if anyone was watching and place something in the engine compartment. Easley turned on his lights, ran checks on both men and arrested Trent on an outstanding warrant.